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STRUCTURING LOGIC PROGRAMS: A MODAL APPROACH* 
LAURA GIORDANO AND ALBERT0 MARTELLI+ 
D Extensions of logic programming languages with structuring constructs 
have been extensively studied in the last years. A particularly clean 
approach consists in allowing implication goals to occur in goals and in 
clause bodies. Implication goals are implications of the form D * G, 
where D is a set of clauses and G is a goal. The clauses in D are intended 
to be local to G, as they can be used only in the proof of G. So implication 
goals can be regarded as blocks of conventional programming languages 
and such an extension provides different kinds of block structured lan- 
guages according to the visibility rules chosen for the local clauses. The 
choices are mainly two: either lexical (static) visibility rules or dynamic 
visibility rules. A further distinction can be made between closed and open 
blocks. In this paper we aim at showing that modal logic provides a 
unifying framework in which different logical languages with blocks and 
modules can be expressed. We show this by interpreting the different block 
languages within modal logic S4. Moreover, we will consider different 
kinds of modules that can be defined from blocks by introducing some 
syntactic sugar and compare them to other proposals in the literature. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The need for structuring constructs to extend logic programs has produced a large 
amount of proposals. Though some of them can be regarded as mainly syntactic 
extensions, others have a clean and logical semantics. Among the latter, a particu- 
larly clean approach for introducing local definitions of clauses consists in allowing 
implication goals to occur nested in goals and in clause bodies. Implication goals 
are implications of the form D * G, where D is a set of clauses and G is a goal. 
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The clauses in D are intended to be local to G, as they can be used only in the 
proof of G. In this way, a goal Gi in a clause G, A *** A G,, +A can be not only an 
atom, but also an implication goal. Since implication goals introduce local clause 
definitions, we will call them blocks, by analogy with conventional Algol-like 
programming languages. 
In [14, 151 such an extension is introduced to deal with hypothetical reasoning 
and the operational semantics of the extended language is proved to be sound and 
complete w.r.t intuitionistic logic (by regarding both + and - as the intuitionis- 
tic implication). For this reason, it is referred to as intuitionistic Zogic programming. 
In [25, 261 a superset of this language is considered, containing also the disjunction 
in goals, and a fixpoint semantics is defined for it. Intuitionistic logic programming 
has also been studied in [23, 241. An analysis of these proposals shows that they use 
dynamic visibility rules for clauses, since, operationally, to prove a goal D - G in a 
program P they prove the goal G in the extended program P U D (and thus P can 
use clauses in D and vice versa). 
However, the same extended language with implication goals can be given a 
different operational semantics if different visibility rules for locally defined clauses 
are chosen. In particular, in [17, 18, 301 languages with static scope rules for clause 
definitions have been defined, in which, as in Algol-like languages, the rules for 
using clauses are determined by the lexical structure of the program (D can use 
clauses in P, but not vice versa). Furthermore, in [18] a notion of closed block is 
defined (as opposed to open block) which mimics at the object level the metapredi- 
cate demo of Bowen and Kowalski [5], so that D - G, roughly speaking, can be 
read as demo(D, G). 
In this paper we want to show that these different languages with blocks can all 
be given a modal characterization in the logic S4. The modal interpretation of the 
language with dynamic visibility rules is the obvious one, since such a language, as 
proved in [15, 261, has an intuitionistic semantics, and intuitionistic logic can be 
interpreted within S4 modal logic. A modal characterization for the language with 
static blocks and closed blocks can be obtained by slight modification. 
As a consequence, a modal extension of Horn clause logic can provide a unifying 
framework in which different kinds of blocks can be defined and integrated. The 
possibility of integrating different kinds of blocks is given by the similarity of their 
modal characterizations. In fact, the difference between the languages with static 
and dynamic visibility rules does not reside in how the implication goal is defined, 
but in how clauses (both the local and the global) are defined. Thus, by allowing 
different kinds of clause definitions (either static or dynamic), an integrated 
language can be defined. 
We want to make clear that our main concern in this paper is not to study how 
logic programming can be extended to modal logic programming in the general 
case. Rather, we will focus on the problem of structuring logic programs and show 
that a modal extension of logic programming is well suited to this purpose. 
The outline of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we recall the definition of 
the different languages with blocks and their operational semantics. Section 3 
presents a modal characterization within S4 of these languages in the propositional 
case. In Section 4 such a characterization is extended to the first-order case and its 
correctness is proved for the language with open static blocks. Moreover, it is 
shown that, without loss of generality, we can restrict our concern to Kripke 
interpretations in which the Herbrand universe is the constant domain of quantifi- 
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cation for each world. In Section 5 the operational semantics of an integrated 
language is defined and some examples of use of the language are provided. In 
particular, we show how modules also can be defined, by introducing some 
syntactic sugar, and we compare them to other proposals for blocks and modules in 
the literature. A final section is devoted to conclusions and related work. 
2. BLOCK LANGUAGES WITH DIFFERENT VISIBILITY RULES 
In this section we recall the syntax and the operational semantics of the different 
block languages. As proposed in [18], we make a distinction among open blocks 
with dynamic visibility rules [14, 251, open blocks with static visibility rules 117, 18, 
301, and closed blocks [181. 
All of these block languages are obtained by allowing implication goals of the 
form D =) G both in goals and in clause bodies. When a goal D 3 G has to be 
proved, the goal G must be proved in the current context (program) extended with 
the local set of clauses D. According to the way the current context is extended 
with D, different kinds of block structured logic languages can be obtained. 
Though their syntax is the same, they differ as regards their operational semantics. 
Let x represent an individual variable. Let A be a first-order atomic formula 
and let T be a propositional constant (true). The syntax of the languages with 
blocks is the following: 
L: G := TIAIG, A G,l3xGID -G, 
D := G +AID, A D,IVxD. 
In this definition G stands for a goal and D stands for a clause or a conjunction of 
clauses. In the following text, D will be regarded interchangeably as a conjunction 
or as a set of clauses. A program is a set of clauses. 
Note that in a goal D - G it is possible for D and G to share variables, like, for 
instance, in the goal 3x[(T -p(x)) - q(x)]. 
Contrary to [26] we have introduced two different implications in goals and in 
clauses. In fact, though in the dynamic case both implications have the same 
semantics (they are both the intuitionistic implication), in the static case the two 
implications are different. 
2.1. Open Blocks with Dynamic Scoping 
According to the analysis in [18], the languages in [14, 25, 261 can be regarded as 
languages with open blocks and dynamic visibility rules. In this section we recall 
their operational semantics following [26] (as a difference, we do not consider 
disjunctions in goals, whose treatment, however, is easy). 
In order to avoid problems with variable renaming and substitutions, given a 
program P, we define a set of clauses [PI, which contains P along with all 
instances of clauses in P obtained by replacing universally quantified variables in 
front of them with ground terms. More precisely, [P] can be defined recursively as 
the smallest set of formulas such that: 
(ii) if D, A D, E [PI, then D, E [P] and D, E [PI; 
(iii) if VxD E [PI, then [x/t]D E [PI for all closed terms t. 
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Given a program P and a closed goal G, the meaning of G being operationally 
derivable from P, that is P t G, is defined by induction on the structure of G as 
follows: 
l PtT; 
l PkAifthereisaformulaG+A~[Pland PEG; 
l Pt-G, AG, ifPEG, and PFG,; 
l P F 3xG if there is a closed term t such that P F [t/x]G; 
l Pt-D-GifPuDFG. 
A derivation of G from P is a sequence of pairs CW,, G,), . . . , (W,, G,), where 
W,=P,G,=G,G,,,=T,and,for i=l,..., m, K F Gi. Derivability of G, from Pi 
can be concluded from the pairs which follow (W,Gi) in the sequence, using the 
rules above. 
The visibility rules for clauses in this block language are dynamic because the 
set of clauses that can be used to solve a goal G depends on the sequence of goals 
generated up to that point and can be determined only dynamically. In fact, an 
implication goal can simply be regarded as specifying a query in an updated 
program. 
Example 2.1. The proof of the goal G = s in the program 
P: r-4 
(((4 -p) A r> -p> -s 
succeeds, since it amounts to proving 
goal ((q -p) A Y) =)p) in P, 
goal p in P’ = P U (q -p, r}, 
goal q in P’, 
goal r in P’, 
which succeeds. The proof of q uses the clause r defined in the inner block, which 
is visible at that point since the block has been added to the program P. If, on the 
contrary, the goal q is called directly from the outer environment, its proof fails. 
With this operational behavior, open blocks with dynamic scoping are well 
suited for hypothetical reasoning. Moreover, as shown in [261, by giving names to 
sets of clauses (for instance, by writing m = D) and by using those names within 
implication goals (as in m - G), modules can be defined. Also, nesting implication 
goals allows modules to be composed. For instance, by means of the query 
ml - (m, * G), G is proved in the union of the two modules m, and m2. 
2.2. Open Blocks with Static Scoping 
Given the above language L with implication goals, static scope rules for local 
definitions of clauses can be obtained by modifying the previously given operational 
semantics (as done in [17, 183). In this case, we want the rules for using a clause to 
be determined only by the static nesting of blocks in the program text. To solve a 
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goal coming from the body of a clause declared in a block, we want to use only the 
clauses declared in that block or in externally nested blocks. With this choice, we 
fail in proving the goal a * b from the program P = {a + c, c + b}, since the atom 
a introduced to prove b is local to the goal and cannot be used to solve the subgoal 
a coming from the body of clause a + c. For this reason, when static scope rules 
are chosen, implication goals cannot be used to model the updating of a set of 
clauses nor to perform hypothetical reasoning. Static scope rules provide struc- 
turing constructs which are closer to those of conventional (Algol-like) block 
structured programming languages. 
Let us define the operational semantics for the language with static scoping. In 
this case it is necessary to consider the derivability of a goal G from a list of 
programs D,I... ID,, i.e., a list of sets of clauses. The list allows us to record the 
ordering between blocks given by their lexical nesting in the program text. The 
higher is the index i of D, in D,I **. ID,,, the deeper is the nesting of Di in the 
program. We can now define the derivability of a goal G from a list of programs 
D, I... ID, by induction on the structure of G as follows: 
. D,l... ID, k T; 
l D,I--.ID,+A if, for some i, 1 <i<n, there is a formula G+AE[D~] and 
D,I... ID, F G; 
l D,I..- ID, k G,.A G, ifD,l+.. ID, k G, and D,I-.. ID,, F G,; 
l D, I *-* 1 D,, t 3xG if there is a closed term t such that D, 1 e-0 ID,, F [t/x]G; 
. D,I.-. ID, t-D =a G ifOIl--. lD,lD F G. 
Notice that when a clause G +A in D; is used to prove an atomic goal A, then 
the clauses in Di+,l-.- ID, cannot be used any more to prove G, since the clauses 
of inner blocks are not visible from external ones (and thus from G). To prove a 
goal D =) G, the set of local clauses D is added to the list of programs as the tail 
element, so that the clauses in D can be used only to prove goals coming from D 
itself or from G. 
It is easy to see that, with this operational semantics, given the program P and 
the goal G of Example 2.1, G is not provable in P. The following is an example of 
successful derivation. 
Example 2.2. The proof of the goal G = s in the program 
P: q 
(WAFP) f4 ‘P) +s 
succeeds, since the local clauses (r A q +p> and r, introduced by proving the 
implication goal ((r A q -p> A r-1 +-p, are used only locally to the block. 
With open static blocks, it is possible to compose different sets of clauses 
(different modules) while retaining a distinction between them. Consider, for 
instance, the query m, -Cm, = (m, * G)), where the mi’s are names for sets of 
clauses as in the previous paragraph. The goal G is proved in the composition of 
the modules m,, m2, and m-,, where m2 can see all definitions in m,, and m3 can 
see all definitions in m, and m2, but not vice versa. In this case, in composing 
modules, inheritance applies only in one direction. 
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3. 
2.3. Closed Blocks 
There is at least one other way to define the operational semantics of the language 
L with implication goals. It is possible to regard an implication goal D - G as 
specifying a change of context: to prove the goal D * G from the program P, 
prove G from the program D (the set of local clauses). For this reason the goal 
D * G can be regarded as mimicking the metapredicate demo(D, G) defined by 
Bowen and Kowalski [51. Notice, however, that while in demo(D,G) D and G can 
be metavariables, this is not the case in an implication goal D = G. 
The derivability of a closed goal G from a program P is defined by induction on 
the structure of G as follows (we do not need a list of programs in this case): 
. PI-T; 
l PtAifthereisaformulaG+A~[P]and PFG; 
* PI-G, AG, ifPl-GG, and PEG,; 
l P t 3xG if there is a closed term t such that P F [t/x]G; 
l PFD=G$D~G. 
The idea of regarding an implication goal as specifying a change of context 
seems to be quite natural. When names are associated with sets of clauses, it 
provides a notion of module which is quite close to the conventional notion of 
module as a closed environment. 
MODAL INTERPRETATION OF THE BLOCK LANGUAGES: THE 
PROPOSITIONAL CASE 
In this section we give the S4 modal interpretation of the languages with blocks 
defined in the previous section. For simplicity, we will start by considering the 
propositional case, in which the differences between the block languages are 
already present in a simpler setting. We will try to give here some intuitive 
motivations to explain why the modal interpretation works. The first-order case will 
be dealt with in the next section. 
3.1. Open Blocks with Dynamic Scoping 
As regards the language with dynamic blocks, in [15, 261 it is proved that the 
operational semantics presented in Section 2.1 is sound and complete w.r.t. 
intuitionistic logic when the two implications * and + are regarded as the same 
implication: the intuitionistic one. Therefore, such a language has the semantics of 
intuitionistic logic and the well known mapping from the language of intuitionistic 
propositional logic to the language of propositional S4 modal logic (see [131) can be 
applied to it. We recall this mapping (denoting it by *) on the propositional 
formulas of the language L: 
T* = T, 
A*= CIA (A is an atomic proposition), 
(aAp)*=a*Ap*, 
(a*p)*= q (a*IP*), 
(a-p)*= q (a* xP*), 
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where I is the material implication and 0 is the universal modal operator. Of 
course, the two different implications are translated in the same way, since both of 
them stand for the intuitionistic implication. 
By applying this mapping, the propositional part of language L can be trans- 
lated into the following language L, in S4 modal logic: 
L,: G:=TloA(G, AG,Io(DIG), 
D:= q (G1 q A)ID, AD,. 
To give an intuitive reading of this modal language, let us recall the Kripke 
semantics for S4 modal logic (see [201X By now we are only interested to the 
propositional case. However, we define first-order Kripke interpretations with 
the Herbrand universe as fixed domain, since we will need such definition in the 
following text, when dealing with the first-order case. 
Let L, be a first-order modal language containing the logical connectives A, 3, 
3, and V and the modal operator 0. Let 17, be the Herbrand universe of the 
language L,, that is, the set of ground terms formed out of the constants and 
function symbols of L,, and let HL be the Herbrand base of L,, that is, the set 
of all ground atoms that can be formed using predicate symbols in L, and terms 
in U,. An (Herbrand) SI-fipke interpretation for L, is a triple M = (W, R, e>, 
where W is a set of worlds, R is a binary relation on W (the accessibility relation) 
which is reflexive and transitive, and e is a valuation function e: W +9n( HL). We 
define the satisfiability of a closed formula (Y of L, at a world w E W in an 
S4-Kripke interpretation M for L, (M,w ks4 a) as follows: 
l M, w ks4 A iff A E e(w) (if A is an atom in HL) 
l M,wt=,, CYAN iff M,wEs, CY and M,wbS4 p 
l M,wkS4 a~/3 iff M,w!#,, (Y orM,wk,, /3 
l M,w bs4 3xcz iff for some closed term t E U,, M,w +, cu[t/x] 
l M, w F~~VXCI iff for all closed terms t E U,, M, w ks4 a[t/xl 
l M, w ks4 q a iff for all worlds w ’ E W such that WRW ‘, M, w ’ KS4 cr. 
A closed formula (Y of L, is true in an S4-Kripke interpretation M = (W, R, e> 
iff M, w KS4 CY, for all w E W. We say that (Y is a SI-valid formula ( ks4 CY) iff it is 
true in every S4-Kripke interpretation for L,,,, i.e., for every S4-Kripke interpreta- 
tion M = ( W, R, e) (for LM), for every w E W, M, w ks4 a. 
The correspondence between the language L with dynamic blocks and its modal 
interpretation L, can be stated as follows: for all programs P and goals G, 
PtG iff i=S4P*3)G*, 
according to the definition of operational derivability given in Section 2.1. 
By the semantics of S4 modal logic, an implication goal 0 (D I G) is true in an 
interpretation M at a world w if, in every world w’ reachable from w in which D is 
true, G is also true. We can see the modal operator 0 as specifying a change of 
world from the current world to a new reachable world. This makes clear how 
an implication goal q (D 3 G) can be regarded as specifying the proof of the 
goal G in a new reachable world, a generic world of which it is only known that it 
satisfies D. 
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Besides, when moving to a new world, the clauses present in the initial program 
still hold. In fact, in the language L,, a program contains clauses of the form 
q (Gx CIA) 
and (by the transitivity of the accessibility relation in the logic S4) if a clause 
q I(G 2 17 A) is true in an interpretation M at a world W, then it is true in that 
interpretation at any world w’ reachable from W. 
Thus, if we go from the world w to the world w’ by updating the database, all 
the clauses of the program will still be available in w’. This models the fact that, 
operationally, in the case of dynamic scoping rules, the clauses in the global 
program are always available for further inferences when new clauses are intro- 
duced by an update. In particular, the clauses added by an implication goal (and 
coming from a certain block) can always be used to prove subgoals coming from 
the body of a clause defined in an external block. In other words, when a clause 
q (G 3 17 A) is entered in the database (by an update), then the possibility of 
proving its body G is affected by the successive updates. 
As an example, consider the program P = {a -+ b) and the goal G = a * b. G is 
operationally provable in the program P. In fact, when a is added to the program 
then b is derivable. In the modal interpretation, the program and the goal become, 
respectively, 
P*={O(OaxOb)) and G*= q (uax q b). 
Therefore, it is quite obvious that ks4 P* I G*. 
3.2. Open Blocks with Static Scoping 
As for open dynamically scoped blocks, we want to define an S4 modal interpreta- 
tion for the propositional subset of the language with static scope rules. To this 
purpose, we define the following mapping * on the propositional subset of L: 
T* = T, 
A*=ClA (A is an atomic proposition), 
(aAp)*=a*Ap*, 
(a*P) * = q ( a* xP*), 
(a+p)*=a*3,*. 
The difference w.r.t. to the previous mapping, which gives the language L,, is 
that the two implications (in goals and in clauses) are interpreted in two different 
ways. The modal operator [7 is not put in front of the implications in clause 
definitions. By applying this mapping to the propositional part of L, we get the 
following language: 
L,: G:=TloAIG,r\G,lo(D~G), 
D:=Gx nAIlI, AD,. 
Since now we have the two languages L, and L, interpreted within modal logic 
S4, we can easily compare them on a syntactic ground. Notice that the only 
difference between the two is that, in the static case, no modal operator occurs 
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in front of clauses, while implication goals are interpreted in both cases in the 
same way. 
This makes clear that, at least in this modal reconstruction, the difference 
between the two languages does not reside in how the implication goal is defined, 
but in how clauses (both the local and the global) are defined. Of course, since the 
definitions of clauses and goals are mutually recursive, the implication goals in 
the languages L, and L, also are different: they differ w.r.t. their local clause 
definitions. 
By considering the possible world semantics for S4 modal logic, the difference 
between the languages L, and L, becomes quite intuitive. We said that the modal 
operator specifies a change of world and an implication goal q (D 3 G) is true 
in an interpretation M at a world w if G is true at all reachable worlds w’ at 
which D holds. Since in the language L, the clauses of a program have the form 
G 3 q A, then it does not hold that if a clause is true in an interpretation M at the 
world w, then it is also true at any world w’ reachable from w, for clauses have no 
modal operator in front of them. 
Thus, if we go from a world w to a reachable world w ’ by updating the database, 
the clause G 2 q A, true in w, may not be true in w’. In fact, in the case of static 
scoping, the clauses in the global program are not available for further inferences 
when we move to a reachable world, i.e., when new clauses are introduced by an 
update. The clauses added by an implication goal (and coming from a certain 
block) cannot be used to prove subgoals coming from the body of a clause defined 
in an external block. 
Only the atomic consequences of clauses in the global program remain available 
in all the reachable worlds and, therefore, clauses in the program can be used to 
prove the body of a clause in a block, but not vice versa. In particular, if the clause 
G 1 q A occurs in the initial program, then proving G cannot be affected by 
successive updates to the program by implication goals: the clauses introduced by 
the successive updates cannot be used to prove G. 
Therefore, the language L, is a very static language in which, given a program, 
the updates occurring in the goal or in the program itself cannot have much 
influence on what is derivable from the initial program. A block allows new atoms 
to be derived by introducing new clauses (procedures), but it does not affect the 
initial program. 
In Section 4 we will prove that the above interpretation of the propositional 
language with open static blocks within S4 modal logic is correct, i.e., we will prove 
that, for all programs P and goals G, 
PkG iff t=s4 P*xG*, 
where F is operational derivability relation as defined in Section 2.2. The 
correctness proof will be provided for the first-order case in Section 4. 
Let us give here just an example. Consider again the program P = {a + b} and 
the goal G = a * b. If static visibility rules are adopted, G is not operationally 
provable in the program P. In fact, to prove a = b, a is added to the program, but 
it cannot be used to prove the goal a coming from the body of the clause a + b in 
the global program since it is not visible. In the modal interpretation, the program 
and the goal are 
P*={UaxOb} and G*=o(oa~ob), 
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and it is not true that ks4 P* I G*. In fact, if we take the S4 interpretation 
M=({w,,w,},R,e), where R=((w,,w,),(w,,w,),(w,,w,)) and e(w,)={ 1 and 
e(w,> = {a}, then M,w, ks4 •I a 1 0 b, but M,w, !#s, q (0 a 2 0 b). 
3.3. Closed Blocks 
The language of closed blocks also can be interpreted within S4-modal logic. In [18] 
a Kripke-like model-theoretic semantics is defined for this language and, mak- 
ing use of it, it is possible to prove that the language of closed blocks can be 
interpreted within S4-modal logic as follows: 
L,: G:= TIAIG, A G,(o(D IG), 
D:=GIAID, AD,. 
The difference w.r.t. the language L, is that in this case there is no 
modal operator in front of atomic formulas. As for the language L,, there is 
no modal operator in front of clause definitions. Therefore, the only occurrence 
of the modal operator is the one in front of implications in goals. 
For this reason, intuitively, the modal operator has the effect of closing a 
context: there is neither a clause nor an atom which has a box in front of it and can 
pass through the modal context. So, when we have to prove a goal q (D 3 G) at a 
world w, we have to move to each reachable world w’ in which D holds. However, 
maybe nothing which holds at w also holds at w’, so G has to be proved in a 
completely new context where only D holds. 
4. THE FIRST-ORDER CASE 
In this section we extend to the first-order case the modal interpretations defined 
in the previous section and we prove their correctness. 
Of course no proof is needed for the language with open blocks and dynamic 
scoping. As said above, intuitionistic logic has been proved to be the underlying 
logic for such a language [I4, 15, 261. In 1261 this result is proved for a language 
which also allows disjunctions in goals. By interpreting intuitionistic logic within 
modal logic S4 in the usual way, we can get a modal interpretation for the 
first-order language with open dynamic blocks, which is obviously correct. 
In this section, we are mainly concerned with the language with open static 
blocks. We prove soundness and completeness of its operational semantics with 
respect to S4-Kripke semantics defined in Section 3.1. Completeness is proved by a 
Henkin-style canonical model construction, which is similar to the one given, for 
the case of intuitionistic logic programming, by Bonner, McCarty, and Vadaparty 
141 and by Miller 1281. We also show that there is no loss of generality in restricting 
the S4-Kripke interpretations to those in which the domain at each world is the 
Herbrand universe. Similar results can be proved for the language with closed 
blocks. 
Let us first consider open dynamic blocks, i.e., intuitionistic logic programming, 
in the first-order case. As done for the propositional case, to interpret such a 
language within modal logic S4, we apply the mapping from the language of 
intuitionistic logic to the language of S4 modal logic (see [131). We have, in 
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addition, to take care of the quantifiers. The mapping (denoted by *> on the 
formulas of the first-order language L, is the following: 
T* = T, 
A*=UA ( A is an atomic formula), 
(cYAp)*=a*Ap*, 
(a-p)*= q (a* xP*), 
(a-,p)*= q (a* xP*), 
pxa>* = q vxa*, 
(3x(Y)* = 3xa*. 
Notice that the modal operator 0 is put in front of the universal quantifier. This 
is needed when we refer to first-order intuitionistic Kripke models with mono- 
tonically increasing domains (also called nested domains). By applying the above 
mapping, we can extend the modal language L, defined in Section 3.1 to the 
first-order case as follows: 
L 1 (first order) ’ G:=TloAlG,r\G,l~xGlo(D~G), 
D := q (G II q A)ID, nD,loVxD. 
It is clear that the modal translation L, of the language with open static blocks 
presented in Section 3.2 cannot be extended to the first-order case in the same way 
as for the intuitionistic language above. In fact, clauses in L, differ from those in 
L,, since the former have an additional 0 in front of them. If in L, the modal 
operator 0 is put in front of universal quantifiers, and thus in front of clauses, the 
difference between L, and L, vanishes in the first-order case. Thus, for the 
language with open static blocks, the mapping * (defined in Section 3.2) is extended 
to quantified formulas in the following way: 
T* = T, 
A*=lIlA ( A is an atomic formula), 
(aA\)*=a*A~*, 
(a-p)*= q (a* xP*), 
(a-p)*=ff*Ip*, 
(tlxa)* = vxff*, 
(3x(Y)* = 3xa* 
(1) 
and the first-order modal interpretation of the language with open static blocks is 
as follows: 
LZ (first order) : G:=TloAlG,AG,13xGlo(D~G), 
D := G 1 0 AID, A D,/VxD. 
So no modal operator is put in front of the universal quantifier in this case. From 
now on we will use L, and L, to refer to the corresponding first-order languages. 
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4. I. Correctness of the Modal Interpretation 
In this subsection we aim at proving correctness for the modal interpretation of the 
language with open blocks with static scoping, i.e., at proving that, for all programs 
P and goals G of the language L, 
PFG iff l=s4 P*3G*, (2) 
where t- is operational derivability relation as defined in Section 2.2, * is the 
mapping (1) defined above, and bs4 is the satisfiability relation for the logic S4 
defined in Section 3.1, where the Herbrand universe U, of the language L is taken 
as the constant domain of each possible world. 
An indirect proof of the above statement has been given in [19]. That proof 
makes use of some results presented in [17, 181, where a fixpoint and a model- 
theoretic semantics have been defined for the language L with static blocks, with 
respect to which the operational semantics defined in Section 2.2 is sound and 
complete. In particular, the model-theoretic semantics is defined in terms of 
Kripke trees whose domain is the Herbrand universe for all possible worlds. In [191 
we made use of this semantics, to prove the equivalence (2). Here, we will give a 
direct proof of it. 
Let us now prove the soundness of the operational semantics with respect to the 
Kripke semantics above. 
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Let P be a program and G be a closed goal in the language L. 
Then, for the language with open static blocks, 
PEG = ks4 P* 3 G*. 
PROOF. In order to prove the thesis, we prove the following more general state- 
ment. For all programs D,, . . . , D,, 
D,I-.- ID, t G - +, q (DT 1 q (D; 1 ... IO(D; 3G*))). 
This amounts to proving that if D,I ... ID, t G, then for every interpretation 
M=(W,R,e)andeveryworldwEW, 
M, w ks4 q (DT 1 q (D; 2 ... 2 q (D; 1G*))). 
The proof is by induction on the length k of the derivation of G from D, I--* ID,,. 
If k = 0, then it must be that G = T. In this case, the thesis holds trivially, since 
T* = T and, for all programs D,, . . . , 0,. 
kS4 q (Dy 3 q (D; 2 ... 2 q (D,f IT))). 
We assume that the thesis holds for those goals whose operational derivation 
has length j <k and we prove it for k, considering all possible cases for G: 
l G = T. The thesis holds trivially. 
l G =A. Assume that D,I ... ID, t-A, with a derivation whose length is k. 
Then for some i (1 I i 5 n), there is a clause G, -+A E [D,l such that 
D,I ... IDi F G, and G, has a derivation with length less than k. Hence, by 
inductive hypothesis, 
I= s4 q (Dy 13 q (D; 2 ... 3 q (D* XC:))), 
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i.e., for every interpretation M = (W, R, e) and every world w E W, 
M, w KS4 q (Dy3o(D;3 ..a II q (D; xG7))). 
Hence, for each sequence of worlds w 1,. . . , wi such that 
wRw,R .-.Rwi and M,wjks,D,* forall j=l,..., i, 
we have that 
(a) M, wi ks4 GT. 
Since G, +A E [ Di], G, -A is a ground instance of some clause in Di. 
From M, w, ks4 0” and the fact that the domain of world w, is U,, we can 
then conclude 
(b) M, wi ks4 GT 3 0 A. 
From (a) and (b), it follows that 
M,w,bss q /t 
and, by transitivity of R, for all wit ,,. ..,w, such that wiRwj+, R .*. Rw,,, 
M,wn KS4 q A. Therefore, since A* = 0 A, 
ks4 q (DT ZI q (D; 2 ... 2 q (D; x4*))). 
l G = G, A G,. Assume that D,I es. 1 D,, t- G, A G,, with a derivation whose 
length is k. Then it must be that D,I *** ID, F G, and D,(.*. ID, t G,, with 
derivations of length less than k. Hence, by inductive hypothesis, 
k4 q (DT 3 q (D; 3, ... 3 q (D; 3G;))) 
and 
ks4 q (Dy II q (D; 2 ... 3 q (D,* 3G;))). 
From this, we can easily conclude that 
I= s4 q (DT ZI q (D; YI ... I ~(0; x(G; AG;)))). 
. G =D 3 G,. Assume that D,I.-- ID,, ED = G,, with a derivation whose 
length is k. Then D, I ... I D,lD t- G,, with a derivations of length less than k. 
Hence, by inductive hypothesis, 
ks4 q (DT 3 q (D; 2 .a. 1 q (D; 3 q (D* IGT)))), 
which is precisely what we wanted to prove. 
l G = 3xG,. Assume that D,I ... ID, F 3xG,, with a derivation whose length is 
k. Then D, I ... ID, F G,[t/x] for some closed term t E U,, with a derivations 
of length less than k. Hence, by inductive hypothesis, 
ks4 q (Dy I q (D; I ... 1 q (D; IGT[~/‘x]))). 
Thus, for every interpretation M = ( W, R, e> and every world w E W, 
M, w bs4 q (DT IJ q (D; 1 ... = q (D; 2 GTb’xl))). 
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Hence, for each sequence of worlds w,, . . . , IV, such that 
wRw, R +*-Rw,, and M,wiFs4Dj* forallj=l,...,n, 
we have that M, wn ks4 GT [t/xl. Hence, M, w, bs4 3xGT. Therefore, 
M, w Es4 q (DT 1 q (D; 3 ..* 3 q (D; 33xGT))). 0 
We will now prove completeness of the operational semantics with respect to 
the Kripke semantics above. Let us first state some lemmas which will be needed. 
These lemmas give some properties of the operational semantics for the language 
with static open blocks. 
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity). Let r, and T, be (possibly empty) sequences of programs, 
let D be a program, and let G be a goal in the language L. Then 
T,lT, F G - r,lar, F G. 
Lemma 2. Let I?,, lY2, and r3 be (possibly empty) sequences of programs, let D be a 
program, and let G be a goal in the language L. Assume that, for all clauses 
G’ +A E [D], 
r,lr, F cf 3 r,lr, h4. 
Then 
ryoir, k G - r,lr,lr, k G. 
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in Appendix A. The proof of Lemma 1 is 
similar to the proof of Lemma 2 and it is omitted. 
We can now prove completeness of the operational semantics with respect to 
the Kripke semantics above. The completeness proof is given by constructing a 
canonical model for a given program P, whose domain is constant and is the 
Herbrand universe of P, U,. 
Definition. The canonical model for P is an S4-Kripke interpretation MC = 
(W, R, e), where: 
l W = {DIl *a* ID,,: n 2 1 and all Di are programs in the language of P}; 
l R is the reflexive and transitive closure of the binary relation on W contain- 
ing all pairs(D,I...ID,,D,I...ID,ID),for all programs D1,...,D,,D in the 
language of P; 
l e(D,]-a- ID,) = {A: D,]--- ID, FA and A is a ground atom in the language 
of P]. 
Note that, by Lemma 1, if D,] ... ID, FA, then D,I*** ]D,+,l+** ID,+, t-A for all 
ground atoms A and programs D,, + 1,. . . , D, + m. Hence, the canonical model has 
the property that 
Ale - Ale, 
for all ground atoms A and all worlds w’ such that WRW’ (i.e., if A holds at a 
world, then it holds at all reachable worlds). 
In the following theorem and corollaries we will assume that all programs and 
goals contain the same symbols as P. 
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Theorem 2. Let D, D,, . . . , D,, be programs and let G be a closed goal. Then, for the 
language with open static blocks, 
(i) MC, D,I.-- ID, +S4 G* * D,I*** ID, + G; 
(ii) MC, D,[ ... ID,, bS4 D*, for all clauses D E [D,]. 
PROOF. We prove (i) and (ii) simultaneously, by induction on the structure of G 
and D. Let us first prove (i). We consider all possible cases for G. 
l If G = T, obvious, since T* = T, M”, D,I*** ID, bs4 T, and D,I-.- ID, k T, 
for all programs D,, . . . , D,,. 
l If G=A, then 
MC, D,I... ID, KS4 A* 
iff MC, D,I-.- ID, bs4 q A 
iff for each world w’ E W such that (D,l**- ID,,w’> E R, A me 
iff A Ee(D,I.*- lD,ID,+,l-.. IDn+m), for all programs Dn+l,...,Dn+m, 
m20 
iffD,I...ID,lD,+ll...ID,+, FA, for all programs Dn+l,...,Dn+m, 
m20 
(by definition of MC> 
iff D, I ... ID, I- A (the ifpart by Lemma 1; the on@ ifpart by taking 
m = 0). 
l If G=G, AG,, then 
MC, D,I ... ID, KS4 (G, A G,)* 
iff MC, D,I-** ID, ks4 GT A GT 
iff MC, D,I*** ID, ~~~ GT and MC, D,I... ID,, ks4 GT 
iff D,I.** ID, F G, and D,I.-- ID, F G, (by inductive hypothesis) 
iff D,I... ID,, F G, AG,. 
l If G = %G,, then 
MC, D,I.-- ID, kS4 (3xG,)* 
iff MC, D, I ... ID, ks4 3xGT 
iff MC, D, 1.1. ID,, ks4 GT[t/x] for some t E Up (by inductive hypothesis) 
iff D,I --* ID,, F G,[t/x] for some t E U, 
iff D,I--. ID,, t- 3xG,. 
l If G = D - G,, we prove the two directions separately. 
(Only if) We assume that MC, D,I... ID, bs4 (D * G,)*. That is, 
MC, D,I *.- ID, bs4 q (D* I GT ), i.e., for each world w’ E W s.t. 
D,I..- IDnRw’, MC,w’ ks4 D* - M’,w’ bs4 GT, i.e., for all programs 
D n+,,..*, D n+m Cm 201, 
MC,D,I-.- lDnlDn+,l-~~ ID,,, KS4 D* 
- MC,D,I-- lQJD,+,l~~~ ID,,, bs4 GT. 
In particular, it holds that 
MC, D,I-.- lD,lD ~~~ D* + Mu, D,I... lD,lD bS4 G:. 
Since D is a subformula of G, by inductive hypothesis, (ii) holds for D and, 
hence, 
MC,D,I-~~ID,IDt=,, D’* forallclauses D’E[D]. 
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Moreover, since D E [II], 
Thus, we can conclude that MC, D,I... ]D,lD ks4 GT. Since G, is a subfor- 
mula of G, by inductive hypothesis, (i> holds for G, and, hence D, I *a. ]D,lD 
I- G,. Thus, 
&I*.. ID,, tD =+ G,. 
(if) We assume that II,\... ID, I-D =$ G,. Hence, it must be that D,I*** ID,,1 
D k G,. We want to show that 
MC,D,I... ID, bs4(D = G,)*, 
i.e., that, for all programs 0, + ,, . . . , D, +m (WI L 01, 
MC,D,I-- lD,lD,+ll-** ID,,, b,4 D* 
- MC,D,I-- lD,lD,+,l.~~ ID,,, KS4 GT. 
Let us assume that MC,D,I~~~ ID,lD,+,1-~~ ID,,,, bs4 D*, that is, all the 
clauses in D* are satisfied in the canonical model, at the world D,I ... 
lD,lD,+,l--- ID,,,. Hence, all their ground instances are satisfied too; that 
is, for all clauses G’ -+A E [ Dl, 
MC, D,I... lDnlDn+ll--. ID,,, 6~ G’* 
= MC, D,I-.a 1QJ~,+,1~~~ ID,,, ks4 A* 
(where A* = q A). By inductive hypothesis, since both G’ and A are 
subformulas of G, we have that 
D,l.** lD,lD,+11*** ID,,, i-G’ 
=+ MC, D,I.-. ID,JDn+ll~~~ ID,,, ksc, G’” 
and 
MC,D,l.- lD,ID,+,I..* ID,,, bs4 A* * D,I--. lD,lD,+,l~~* ID,,, E-A. 
Thus, for all clauses G’ +A E ID], 
D,I-*. (DnIDncll... ID,,, t-G’ ==, D,I... lD,lD,+,l... ID,,, +A. 
From this and the fact that D, I ... ID, ID F G,, by applying Lemma 2, we get 
D,I... lD,,lD,+,1-.* ID,,, t-G,. 
Since G, is a subformula of G, by inductive hypothesis, (i> holds for G, and 
we have 
MC,D,I- lD,lD,+,l--* ID,,, h GT. 
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Thus, we have proved that, for all programs D, + 1,. . . , D, +,,, (m 2 O), 
MC, D,l--. lD,lD,,+,l..* ID,,, @s4 D* 
=a MC,D,I-- lD,lD,+,l~~~ ID,,, KS4 GT. 
Let us now prove (ii>. 
l D = G +A. If MC, D,I ... ID, ks4 G*, then, since G is a subformula of D, (i) 
holds for G and, hence, D, I *-a ID, k G. Since G +A E [D,], we have that 
D,I..- ID, tA. By Lemma 1, D,I--- ID,,lD,,+,l~~~ ID,,,, FA, for all programs 
D n+,7...> D n+m (m 2 0). Ag ain, since A is a subformula of D, (i) holds for A 
and, hence, MC, D,I-.. lD,,lD,+,l*.* ID,,,, ks4 A for all Dnfl,..., D,,, 
(m 2 O), and thus MC, D,I... ID, ks4 0 A, i.e., MC, D,I-** ID, ks4 A*. 
Therefore, MC, D,I-.- ID, != (G +A)*. 
l D = D, AD,. If D, AD, E [D,], then D, E [D,] and D, E [D,z]. Since, by 
inductive hypothesis, (ii> holds for the subformulas of D, 
MC, D,].-. ID, t=s4 DT and MC, D,].-. ID,, ~~~ 0:. 
Hence, MC, D,I--- IDB i==s4 (DI A D2)*. 
l D = VxD. If tlxD E [Dnl, then D[t/xl E ID,] for all f E U,. Since, by induc- 
tive hypothesis, (ii> holds for the subformulas of D, 
MC, D,I--- ID, ks4 D*[t/x] for all t E U,. 
Hence, MC, D, I ... ID, ks4 (VxD)*. q 
The following Corollaries 1 and 2 are immediate consequences of Theorem 2. 
Corollary 1. Let P be a program and let G be a closed goal in the language L. Then, 
for the language with open static blocks, 
MC,Pks,G* * PkG. 
PROOF. From Theorem 2, point (i), for n = 1. 0 
Corollary 2. Let P be a program in the language L. Then, for the language with open 
static blocks, 
MC, P i=s4 P*. 
PROOF. From Theorem 2(n), it follows that MC, P ks4 D* for all clauses D E [PI. 
From this the thesis holds, since P E [PI. 0 
We can now prove the following completeness result. 
Corollary 3 (Completeness). Let P be a program and let G be a closed goal of L. Then, 
for the language with open static blocks, 
~~~ P* I G* * PkG. 
PROOF. Let us assume that KS4 P* 1 G*. Then, for every Kripke interpretation 
M = (W, R, e), for every w E W, 
M, w ks4 P* = M,w ks4 G*. 
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In particular, this holds for the canonical model MC and for the world P: 
MC, PkS4 P* - MC, Pks, G*. 
Since, by Corollary 2, MC, P ks4 P*, we can conclude that MC, P k+, G*, and, by 
Corollary 1, that P F G. 0 
We have proved that the modal interpretation of the language with open static 
blocks within the logic S4 is correct. It has to be noticed, however, that the modal 
interpretation we have provided is also correct if we take the logic K4 instead of 
S4; that is, for a program P and a closed goal G, 
PEG iff FK4 P*xG*. (3) 
As a difference with respect to S4, in K4-Kripke interpretations the accessibility 
relation R is transitive, but not reflexive. A proof of the statement (3) can be easily 
provided. Indeed, completeness, i.e., the if part of (31, holds since any S4 interpre- 
tation is a K4 interpretation and, therefore, kK4 P* 3 G* implies ks4 P* I G*, 
which, by Corollary 3, implies P t G. Soundness, i.e., the only if part of (31, can be 
proved precisely in the same way as the soundness result with respect to S4 given in 
Theorem 1. In fact, the proof of Theorem 1 does not make any use of reflexivity of 
the accessibility relation R. 
In a similar way, it is possible to show that the modal interpretation we have 
provided for the language with closed blocks is correct both for the logic S4 and for 
the logic K (in K-Kripke interpretations there are no conditions on the accessibility 
relation RI. In the following, however, we will consider interpretations of the block 
languages in the logic S4. 
4.2. Herbrand Domains 
In Section 4.1 we proved soundness and completeness of the operational semantics 
with respect to S4-Kripke semantics, for the language with open static blocks. In 
doing this, we have considered Kripke interpretations having the Herbrand uni- 
verse as the constant domain for each world, as defined in Section 3.1. We will now 
prove that, for the language L,, given a program P, there is no loss of generality in 
restricting to the SCKripke interpretations on the Herbrand domain. 
In order to make this proof simpler, we will assume that the language L, does 
not contain function symbols, but only constants. We will make use of SbKripke 
interpretations as defined in [12]. As a difference w.r.t. the Kripke semantics in 
Section 3.1, here we will not assume that the domain is constant. On the contrary, 
the domain can change from one world to another and can be different from the 
Herbrand universe. The only restriction on domains is that the domain of a world 
w is contained in the domain of all worlds reachable from w, i.e., domains are 
increasing. 
Let L, be a first-order modal language containing countably many constants, 
variables, and predicate symbols. Let LM be the language obtained by adding to 
L, countably many new constants. We consider Kripke interpretations which have 
the constants of LM as domain and which interpret each constant as naming itself. 
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Thus, in the following text, we only need to specify the interpretation for predicate 
symbols and not for constants. 
I Definition. An S4-Kripke interpretation is an ordered quadruple A4 = ( W, R, 9, e), 
where: 
l W is a nonempty set of worlds; 
l R is a binary relation on W (accessibility relation) which is reflexive and 
transitive; 
l 5B is a function from W to nonempty sets of constants LM (it associates a 
domain with each world), satisfying the condition 
for w,w’ E W, if wRw’ then g(w) c_~(w’); 
l e is a function assigning, to each world w E W, a set e(w) of ground atoms 
p(a,,,.., a,), where each a, is a constant in 9(w). 
Let !=s4 be a relation between members of W and statements LM CM, w l=s4 X 
means: X is true at w in the interpretation M) satisfying, for all w E W, the 
following conditions: 
. M,wk,,T 
l M, w KS4 p(a,, . . . , a,) iff p(u,, . . . , a,) E e(w) 
l M,w ks4 a~/3 iff M,w~=s, (Y and M,w ks4 p 
l M,wEs4 cz2,P iff M,wKs, (Y or M,weS4 p 
l M,w bs,Vxcu iff for each c in 9_(w), M,w ks4 a[c/x] 
l M,w Fs4 3x(u iff for some c in g_(w), M,w bs4 (Y[c/x] 
l M,w%, 13 (Y iff for all world w ’ E W such that WRW ‘, M, w ’ bs4 a. 
A closed formula (Y of the language LM is SI-satisfiable if there is a S4-Kripke 
interpretation M = (W, R, _9, e) and some w E W with every constant of cx in 
9(w) such that M,w ks4 a. We say that (Y is a SI-valid formula (ks4 a> if, for 
every S4-Kripke interpretation M = (W, R, 53, e), for every w E W with every 
constant of CY in _9_(w), M, w ks4 a. 
Notice that, as a difference with respect to the definition in Section 3.1, when 
dealing with the first-order case, it is meaningful to speak of the truth of a formula 
in an interpretation at a certain world only if the constants in that formula are in 
the domain of the world. When function symbols are present, there are additional 
problems, since each function symbol can be given a different interpretation at 
each different world. For simplicity, we have only considered the case when the 
language contains no function symbols. For a survey of the different systems for 
quantified modal logic, see [16]. 
Given a program P in the modal language L,, we want to show that, without 
loss of generality, we can take into account only S4 interpretations with constant 
domain UP; that is, interpretations (as those defined Section 3.1) in which, for all 
worlds w E W, 9(w) = Up. In essence, for this fragment of S4, it is not necessary to 
consider interpretations containing the additional constants in LT . We can prove 
the following proposition. 
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Proposition I. Let P and G be a program and a closed goal of the modal language 
L,. If, for a given S4 interpretation M = (IV, R, 8, e) and a world w E 
IV with every constant of P in 9;(w), M,w KS4 P A 1 G, then there is an 
S4 interpretation MH = ( W, R, &, eH > with constant domain U,, such that 
MH,wbs4 PA TG. 
PROOF. See Appendix B. 0 
In the proposition above we have assumed that the goal G contains the same 
symbols as P. It is well known that such a proposition does not hold if we take, 
instead of D A 7 G, an arbitrary modal formula CY of the language L,. Consider 
the formula (Y =~(a) A TBF, where BF = Vx q p(x) 3 q Vxp(x>, which is 
an instance of the Barcan formula. Then U, = {a). Let us assume that b 
is an additional constant in L; . Let M be the interpretation (Iw,, w,}, R, 9~, e), 
such that R = {(w,,w2),(w1,w,),(wz,w2)J, a ENw,), b ENw,), a,b E@w~), and 
e(w,) = e(w,) = {p(a)}. So p(a) is true both at w1 and at w2 while p(b) is false at 
w2; p(b) has no truth value in w1 since b is not in the domain of wi. It is clear that 
BF is not true at w1 in M and thus M,w, bs4 7BF. Therefore, M, w1 ks4 p(a) A 
7 BF, i.e., M, w1 ks4 CY. On the contrary, there is no Kripke interpretation with 
constant domains in which 7BF is true at some world. In fact, BF is true at 
any world in any interpretation with constant domain. In particular, we cannot 
find a model MH with constant domain U, = (a} and a world w’ such that MH, 
w’ bs4 p(u) A TBF. Thus the proposition above does not hold for the formula 
(Y =~(a) A 7BF. 
By Proposition 1, we can consider, for the language L,, only Kripke interpreta- 
tions having as constant domain the Herbrand universe, as usual in logic program- 
ming. In fact, the following corollary holds. 
Corolluly 4. For all programs P and goals G of L,, KS4 P 13 G iff P 2 G is true in all 
K?ipke S4-interpretations with constant domain U, (written bS4,H P I G). 
PROOF. (Only if) It is obvious that if P 3 G is true in all Kripke S4 interpretations, 
then P 3 G is true in all Kripke S4 interpretations with constant domain U,. 
(Zf) We make use of Proposition 1 to prove that if P 3 G is true in all Kripke S4 
interpretations with constant domain U,, then ks4 P IJ G. In fact, let us start from 
the hypothesis I=~~, H P 3) G. If P 3 G is not S4-valid, then its negation P A 7 G is 
true in some model M at some world w. Therefore, by Proposition 1, there is an 
interpretation MH, with constant domain U,, such that P A 7 G is also true in MH 
at w. Hence, P 2 G is not true in all Kripke S4-interpretations with constant 
domain U,, which contradicts the hypothesis ks4, H P I G. 0 
A similar result can also be obtained for the language L, with open dynamic 
blocks and for the language L, with closed blocks. Therefore, for all these 
languages, we are allowed to consider only Kripke interpretations with the Herbrand 
universe as constant domain. Proposition 2 in Appendix B is the analogue, for the 
language L,, of Proposition 1 above. 
Notice that, when Kripke interpretations with constant domain U, are consid- 
ered for the language L,, the modal operator 0 in front of universal quantifiers 
can be eliminated. It is easy to see that, by replacing q VXD with VxD in the 
first-order modal language L,, an equivalent language is obtained (see Proposition 
3 in Appendix B). In the following, therefore, by L, we will refer to the language 
without q in front of VxD. 
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5. AN INTEGRATED LANGUAGE 
We have shown that the different languages with blocks considered in the paper all 
can be interpreted within modal logic S4. Hence, it is possible to integrate them by 
defining a single modal language which allows different kinds of scope rules for 
clause definitions, as follows: 
L,: G := Tlo AIG, A G,lZlxGlo(D IG), 
D := q (G I q A)lG 1 q AID, r\D,IVxD. 
Note that since in this language different kinds of clause definitions are allowed 
(also in the same block), it is no longer meaningful to speak of static or dynamic 
blocks. Instead, we will speak of static clause definitions [i.e., definitions of the 
form G 1 q A] and dynamic clause definitions [of the form IJ(G 3 0 All. With 
this language it is feasible to distinguish among the static and the dynamic parts 
of a program, thus allowing a partial use of compilation techniques when static 
clauses are employed. 
To define the operational semantics of this language, since static clause defini- 
tions are allowed, it is necessary to consider the derivability of a goal G from a list 
of programs D, I ... ID,, as in the case of open static blocks. The derivability of a 
closed goal G from a list of programs D, I --* ID, can be defined by induction on the 
structure of G as follows: 
. D,I.-- ID, I- T; 
l D,I...ID,~UAif,forsomei,l~i~n, 
there is a clause IZI(G 3 E! A) E [Di] and D,I*-- ID, t G 
or there is a clause G 3 0 A E [Di] and D,I ... I 
Di F G; 
l D,I--- ID, k-G, A G, ifOIl*.. ID, I-G, and D,I... ID, F G,; 
l D,I... ID,, k 3xG if there is a closed term t such that D,I*** ID, k G[t/x]; 
. D,I..- ID, t- q (D zG) ifD,l--. lD,lD t- G. 
The operational semantics of the implication goal q (D IJ G) is the same as for 
open static blocks (the set of local declarations D is added to the list of programs 
as the tail element), but a different use of the list of programs is done each time a 
new clause is selected, according to its kind. Notice that when a static clause 
G 3 0 A is selected from Dj to prove an atomic goal IJ A, then the clauses in 
Di+ II ... ID, cannot be used any more to prove G, since the clauses of inner blocks 
are not visible from external ones (and thus from G). When a dynamic clause 
III (G 3 0 A) is selected in Di to prove 0 A, then all the programs D,, . . . , D, in 
the list can be used to prove G (i.e., the clauses in the different blocks are regarded 
as being indistinguishable). 
When a static clause is used in a program, its body can be considered as 
completely defined in the enclosing blocks and no successive update can affect it. If 
the body is true, then the head of the clause will be visible in the nested blocks. On 
the other hand, the body of a dynamic clause also can be proved dynamically using 
clauses introduced by updates. 
It has to be noticed that clauses of the form G IA (those occurring in the 
language L,) cannot be easily added to the language L,. Moreover, their addition 
to L, would not allow closed blocks to be defined. In fact, closed blocks are 
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provided by the language L, by only allowing the modal operator to occur in front 
of implications in goals. To recover the possibility of defining closed blocks, it 
suffices to introduce in the language L, a new universal modal operator [cl] (we 
move to a multimodal logic) for which the axioms of S4 modal logic hold. Consider 
an extended language with the following syntax: 
L,: G:=TIoAIG,AG,~~xG~o(~~G)~[c~](D~G), 
D := q (G 3 0 A)]G 2 0 AID, r\D,]VxD. 
A Kripke interpretation for this language has to contain a second accessibility 
relation associated with the additional modal operator [cl]. Since the modal 
operator [cl] only occurs in front of implication goals, its effect consists of closing 
a context, i.e., to allow closed blocks. In fact, to deal with such closed impZications 
the following new rule has to be added to the operational semantics for the 
language L, : 
. o,l...Io,~[cl](D~G)ifDt-G. 
When a closed implication [cl](D 3 G) has to be proved, the current context (list of 
programs) is removed and G is proved in the local set of clauses D. 
In the rest of this section we will introduce some syntactic sugar on this 
integrated language in order to explore its potential uses in building structured 
logic programs. Though the language defined above is probably too complex to be 
used in practice, we believe that, on its base, a higher level language subsequently 
could be defined which allows for more concise notations (for instance, to distin- 
guish static clauses from dynamic ones and open blocks from closed ones) and also 
for a more constrained combination of the different constructs. 
5.1. Some Syntactic Sugar to Define Modules 
As already mentioned in Section 2, modules can be defined in a language with 
blocks if module names are associated with sets of clauses and used in implication 
goals. For instance, a module m can be defined as consisting of the set of clauses 
D by the definition 
m is-mod D, 
where m is a term, the name of the module, and the language of the clauses in D 
is the modal language L, or one subset of it. Once the name of the module has 
been associated with a set of clauses in this way, then the module name can be 
used in implication goals. We can write 
q (mxG) 
to say that the goal G has to be proved in the module m. Since in implication goals 
q I( D 2 G) the clauses D and the goal G are allowed to share variables, in a 
module definition, m is mod D, D is allowed to contain free variables and m must 
be parametric in these variables. 
The operational semantics of this language with modules is the same as for the 
block language if each occurrence of a module name is replaced with the corre- 
sponding set of clauses. Of course, this preprocessing can be performed only if the 
modules are not recursively defined. The different kinds of clauses that a module 
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contains cause how the module interacts with other modules. In the following text 
we will consider several kinds of modules and ways to combine them. 
In a very simplistic view, we can assume that a module is a closed environment 
which exports every predicate symbol defined inside it and imports a predicate 
symbol from other modules by explicitly referring to those modules. We can obtain 
closed modules of this kind, by defining each module m,, . . . , mk as a set of clauses 
(either static or dynamic) in the language L,. The goal [cl](m, 3 G) succeeds if G 
succeeds from the clauses in module mi. Such implication goals, of course, can 
occur within each module. Thus a module mj is able to import a predicate A from 
m, explicitly by the implication goal [cl](mi IA). Moreover, every proposition 
defined in a module can be regarded as exported; that is, it can be queried from 
other modules. Notice that in order to obtain closed modules, it is essential to use 
the modal operator [cl] in front of implication goals. 
A more complex kind of open module (called unit) has been defined in [29]. The 
operational semantics of this language with units is quite similar to the one for 
static open blocks. A difference is that predicate overriding is employed; that is, the 
most recent definition of a predicate in a sequence overrides the previous ones. To 
model this kind of module in our language (apart from predicate overriding) is 
straightforward: it suffices to allow each module to contain only (static) clauses of 
the form G 3 0 A, as in language L,, where G also may contain implication goals 
of the form q (mj 3 G) corresponding to the “context extension formulas” m B- G 
in [291. In this way, modules are no longer closed and can be composed. It has to be 
noticed, however, that the language in [29] also allows for the definition of mutually 
recursive units that are not allowed here. 
An example of module composition, which is adapted from [29] (we will not 
introduce quantifiers explicitly and we will assume that all clauses are implicitly 
universally quantified), is 
authors is-mod { 0 wrote(Person, Something) 1 •I author(Person)) 
books is-mod IT 3 13 wrote(plato, republic). 
T 3 0 wrote(homer, iliad). 
[7 (authors 1 q author(Person)) 2 q writer(Personj.1, 
where the goal 0 (books EJ 0 writer(plato)) has the derivation 
t q (books 3 q writer(plato)) 
books t- 0 writer(plato1 
books F 0 (authors 3 0 author(plato)) 
bookslauthors F q author(plato) 
bookslauthors t- 0 wrote(plato, Something) 
books t T. 
Here, according to the static visibility rules, the inner module authors implicitly 
imports all the facts that are provable in the module books, but not vice versa. 
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Note that modules can also be composed by nesting them in the initial goal. For 
instance, given a module sort defining a predicate quicksort 
sort is-mod { . . . 
. . . 0 greater_than(X, Y) . . . 3 0 quicksort(. . . . . .). 
. . . . . 1 
and two different modules defining a predicate greater-than, 
integers is-mod { . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 2 q greater_than(X,Y). 
. . . . 1 
char is-mod { . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . .3) 0 greater_than(X, Y ), 
. . . . 1 
the two goals 
q (integers 2 q (sort 2 q quicksort( . . . ))) 
and 
q (char 3 q (sort 3 q quicksort( . ..))) 
will compute quicksort in two different environments. 
In a similar way, in this language it is possible to define a module system in 
which the composition of modules consists of the union of the modules. In this 
case, all clauses contained in each module must be dynamic, i.e., of the form 
q (G 3 0 A), so that, given the query IZI(M, 3 q (mj 3 G)), the goal G is proved in 
the union of the modules mi and m,. Of course, these modules are those defined 
in [26] by adding some syntactic sugar to the language with dynamic blocks. 
The block language we have used to build the different kinds of modules is the 
language L,. Therefore, in the same program it is also possible to define different 
kinds of modules and even to define a module containing both static and dynamic 
clauses. This provides a considerable flexibility, since it allows us to make use of 
dynamic features only when needed, while leaving the rest of the program static. 
The presence of static and dynamic clause definitions in a module allows US to 
specify which clauses of the module are exported to other modules. Thus, if a 
module m contains a dynamic clause of the form q (G 2 0 A), such a clause is 
intended to be visible to other modules. Of course, since modules are composed by 
means of implication goals as 
q (m, 1 q (m, 3 q (m, I@)), 
the direction of the export is determined by the nesting of implication goals: 
module m, exports toward all the more deeply nested modules Cm2 and m,), while 
m2 only exports to m3 (and not to ml). So, each dynamic clause defined in a 
module is visible to internally nested modules or, in other words, can be affected by 
successive updates. 
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On the contrary, a clause of the form G 2 q A in the module m is not visible to 
internally nested modules. The possibility of proving G is not affected by succes- 
sive updates. Consider, for instance, the following example. 
Example 5.1. If we have the two modules 
m4 is-mod{OdI q a 
q (nbI q d)} 
m5 is-mod {T 3 0 b), 
then the goal q (m, II q (m, I 0 d)) succeeds from the program consisting of the 
two modules (since the body q b of the second clause of m4 can be proved in the 
module m,), while the goal q (m, I q (m, 3 0 a)) fails, since the first clause in m4 
is static and the proof of its body 0 d cannot make use of clauses defined in more 
internal modules as m5. Notice that not only 0 d has to be resolved with a clause 
in m4, but all the proof of q d has to be done in m4. 
5.2. Statically Configured Module Systems 
In [6] a distinction is made between statically and dynamically conjigured module 
systems. A statically configured system is defined as a system where hierarchies 
among units (i.e., modules) are specified when units are defined. In these systems 
the context in which a unit is used does not depend on the dynamic sequence of 
goals, but is always fixed. On the contrary, in a dynamically configured system the 
context in which a module is used can be different in different queries (see the 
above sort example). To define statically configured units, in [6], the statement 
unit(m,,static([m,,m,,m,]) 
is introduced, whose meaning is that whenever the unit m, is used, it is used in the 
context of the modules m2, m3, m4. 
In our language, statically configured modules can be allowed by regarding the 
above static unit definition as syntactic sugar. Its meaning is that each occurrence 
of the implication goal q (m, I G) in the program has to be replaced with the 
implication goal 
[cl](m, 1 q (m, = q (m,I q (mr IG)))). 
In this way, the context in which m, is used is always the closed context containing 
m2, m3, and m4. A preprocessing step is needed to make the replacement above 
and, in general, more steps are needed if more than one unit is defined as statically 
configured. 
In [6] it was shown that the choice of statically configured modules with dynamic 
visibility rules for clauses is suitable for dealing with inheritance based systems. 
Indeed, statically configured modules can be used to represent the static dependen- 
cies among modules in a hierarchy. We rephrase in our language an example 
presented in [6] and taken from [22]. Rephrasing is needed since overriding is 
not provided by our language. Notice also that we do not deal with multiple 
inheritance. 
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Example 5.2. Let us consider three modules, named, respectively, animal, bird, and 
tweety. Since what is true for animals is also true for birds, the bird module inherits 
from the animal module. Moreover, the module nYeety inherits from bird and thus 
from animal. Let us assume that there are no modules more general than animal. 
To model this situation, the following static unit declarations have to be intro- 
duced: 
unit(anima1, static([ I>. 
unit(bird, static([animall). 
unit(tweety, static([birdl). 
The modules animal, bird, and tweety are defined as follows: 
animal is-mod 
{T I q mode(walk). 
q ( q no-offlegs(2) 1 q modecrun)). 
q ( q no_of_legs(4) 1 q mode(gallop)).) 
bird is-mod 
{T 3 I? nooofflegs(2). 
T 1 q covering(feather).} 
tweety is-mod 
{T 3 q owner(fred).) 
Because of the static configuration, when a goal q ( 0 tweety 3 0 mode(run)) is 
called, it is replaced, by a preprocessing, by the goal 
[cl](animal 3 q (bird I> •1 (tweety 1 0 mode(run)))). 
So, the goal q mode(run) is proved in the list of modules, animal/bird/t-wee@ 
Since the clause for q mode(run) in the module animal is dynamic, the subgoal 
~no_of_legs(2) can be proved in the nested (more specific) module bird and, 
therefore, the call succeeds. Thus, the use of dynamic clauses provides something 
similar to the self annotation in object-oriented languages. On the contrary, the 
use of static clauses has similarities with the super annotation: the definition of 
predicates in the body of a static clause is looked for in less specific modules (or in 
the current one). 
5.2. Combining Block and Module Constructs 
We have seen that, when defining a module as a set of clauses, the kind of clauses 
in the module (whether they are dynamic or static) determine how the module 
interacts with other modules. In any case, the clauses in a module mi can contain 
implication goals both of the form q (rnj 3) G), which calls for a proof of the goal G 
in the module m,, and of the form q (D 1 G), that is a block. Therefore, the 
internal language of a module can be a language with blocks. 
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The possibility of combining blocks and modules allows us, for instance, to 
define closed modules (by means of the operator [cl]) whose internal language is a 
language with blocks, open static blocks as well as dynamic blocks. This seems to 
be an interesting possibility, since we believe that while open blocks are well suited 
for programming in the small, they do not always well fit the needs of programming 
in the large. A notion of module as a closed environment, with a rather limited and 
disciplined interaction with the external environment (to be specified by an 
interface) seems to be more adequate in this case. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RELATED WORK 
In this paper we have proposed a use of modal logic to introduce structuring 
constructs in logic programming. In particular, we have provided a modal recon- 
struction of several logic languages with embedded implications (blocks). The 
languages in [14, 25, 231 that have dynamic visibility rules for locally defined clauses 
are based on intuitionistic logic and have a straightforward interpretation within 
modal logic S4. We have defined a similar modal interpretation for languages with 
static or lexical visibility rules [18, 301 and for a language with closed blocks [181 in 
which closed blocks are the object-level analogue of the demo operator introduced 
by Bowen and Kowalski [5]. Some of the results of this paper were first presented 
in a shorter paper [191. 
We have shown that an integrated language with blocks can be defined within 
this modal framework and it is suitable to provide different kinds of module 
constructs. It can provide a notion of closed module along with the possibility 
of dynamically composing modules as in [261 and also of having a more static 
composition of modules as in [29]. Moreover, to represent static dependencies 
of modules in a hierarchy, the definition of static configurations of modules [61 is 
also allowed. In essence, modal logic can provide a unifying framework in which 
different proposals for blocks and modules in logic programming can be captured 
so that different structuring constructs can be integrated in the same language and 
also used in the same program. 
An alternative way to define modules was proposed in [3]. There, instead of 
using syntactic sugar to assign a name to each module, a multimodal logic is used; 
each modal operator refers to a module. 
A similar use of multimodal logic to structure logic programs has been done in 
[ill, where a language with modules inspired by the proposal by Monteiro and 
Porto [29] is defined. To design a module, a set of predicate names is used (the 
predicate names whose definitions are contained in the module) and this allows 
predicate overriding to be modelled. 
In [271, to allow lexical scoping in the context of intuitionistic logic program- 
ming, a use of universal quantification in goals and clause bodies has been 
proposed. A goal VxG, where the variable x can range over individuals, functions, 
or predicates, succeeds from a program P, if G succeeds from P when x is 
replaced in G by a new constant c. Universal quantification can provide lexical 
scoping for individual, function, and predicate constants. In particular, the use of 
predicate variables allows static visibility rules for clauses to be defined: given the 
goal Vp<D * G), the predicate variable p is bound to a predicate constant which is 
only visible in D and G. In general, such use of universal quantification allows 
abstract data types to be defined. 
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A different framework for structuring logic programs has been defined in [7]. 
There a distinction is made between conservative and evolving policies and between 
statically and dynamically con&wed systems. We have already discussed the distinc- 
tion between statically and dynamically configured systems in the previous section 
and we have shown that static configurations of modules can be defined by making 
use of the modal operator [cl] for closed modules. The distinction between con- 
servative and evolving policies roughly corresponds to our distinction between 
static and dynamic visibility rules. As a difference, while we regard clauses as being 
either static or dynamic, in [7] such a behavior is referred to the goals in clause 
bodies. 
As pointed out in the Introduction, the aim of this paper is not to define a 
general purpose modal extension of logic programming, but to show how a very 
limited modal extension of Horn clause logic can provide different structuring 
facilities and can allow them to be integrated in a single language. More gen- 
eral modal extensions are considered in [I], where resolution proof systems for 
several modal logics are presented, and in [lo], where an extension of Prolog with 
modal operators, called MOLOG, is presented. In [lo] a resolution procedure, 
close to Prolog resolution, is defined for modal Horn clauses in the logic S5 which 
contains only universal modal operators of the form Know(a). 
A temporal logic programming language TEMPLOG, which allows certain 
temporal operators in Horn clauses, has been defined in [2]. In TEMPLOG a 
distinction is made between initial clauses and permanent clauses, which appears to 
be similar to our distinction between local and dynamic clauses. No embedded 
implications are allowed in TEMPLOG. 
In [33], a modal operator assume is proposed, which can replace many uses of 
assert in a logic program. The operator assume allows the program to be updated 
during the computation by addition of new facts (atomic formulas). 
To conclude, we want to mention briefly some other approaches that have 
been proposed to introduce module constructs in logic programming: the algebraic 
approach proposed in [32] and also developed in [211, the approach based on 
second order logic [31, 91, and, finally, the metalevel approach 15, 81. 
We believe that our proposal has the main advantage of accommodating 
different structuring facilities in a unique framework and allowing them to be 
combined in an integrated language, for which an operational semantics can be 
defined in the same style as for ordinary Horn clause logic and whose model 
theoretic semantics enjoys very similar properties (for instance, as for Horn clause 
logic, Herbrand domains are sufficient). 
APPENDIX A 
The following repetition of Lemma 2 states a property of the operational semantics 
for the language with static open blocks. 
Lemma 2. Let rl, I?,, and r3 be (possibly empty) sequences of programs, let D be a 
program, and let G be a goal in the language L. Assume that, for all clauses 
G’ +A E [D], 
I-, lr2 k G' - r,lr,t-A. 
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Then 
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the length h of the derivation of G from 
I, IDlI,. 
If h = 0, then it must be that G = T, and the thesis holds trivially. We assume 
that the thesis holds for those goals whose operational derivation has length j <h 
and we prove it for h, considering all possible cases for G. 
l G = T. The thesis holds trivially, as above. 
l G =A. Assume that D,I... IDklD(Dk+ll-.. ID,, FA, with a derivation whose 
length is h. Then, there are three cases: 
(1) There is a clause G’ -+A E [Di] such that D,I--- IDi t- G’, for some 
i=l >..*, 
(2) There is ,“clause G’ -A E [D] such that D,I*-- ID,ID t-G’. 
(3) ThereisaclauseG’+AEIDi]suchthat D,I...lDklDIDk+,l...IDi~G’, 
for some i = k + 1,. . . , n. 
In case (11, it trivially holds that D,I--. IDklr21Dk+ll.*. ID, EA. 
In case (2), since G’ has a derivation with length less than h, by inductive 
hypothesis, D, I .*- I Dklr2 F G’. Moreover, given that G’ +A E [D] and the 
hypothesis (9, from D,I ... ID,Ir, F G’ we can conclude that D,I-.. lDklr, t 
A and, hence, by monotonicity (Lemma 0, that D, I -.* I D,lr,l D,, , I -** I 
D, EA. 
In case (31, since G’ has a derivation with length less than h, by inductive 
hypothesis, D,I-*- IDkllY21Dk+ll*-. IDi b G’. Since G’ -A g[Dil, then 
D,I-.. lQJ,l~~+~l-~- ID, t--A. 
l G = G, A G,. Assume that D,I-.. IDkJDIDk+,(.-- ID, F G, A G,, with 
a derivation whose length is h. Then it must be that D, I -.. ID, (DI D, + 1 I ... I 
D, t G, and D,J--- lD,lD)D,+,l-*. ID,, F G,, with derivations of length less 
than h. Hence, by inductive hypothesis, 
D,I--- lDkl~~lD~+J-. ID, E G,, 
D,I .** l~kl~,l~~+ ,I *.. ID, k G,, 
and, therefore, 
-. G = D * G,. Assume that D,I--- (DklDID,+,j**- ID,, F D, - G,, with a 
derivation whose length is h. Then D,I-*- (DklDIDk+ll--- lD,lD, F G,, with 
a derivation of Iength less than h. Hence, by inductive hypothesis, 
D,I-0. lD,J-~lD~+~l-.- ID,@, kGG,, 
and, thus, 
D,I--- lD~t~J&+,l-.- ID, t D, -G,. 
l G = 3xG,. Assume that D,I-*. JDklDIDk+,l-.* ID,, F 3xG,, with a derivation 
whose length is h. Then it must be that D,I--- lDklDID,+,l-*- ID, b G,[t/x] 
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for some closed term t, with a derivation of length less than h. Hence, by 
inductive hypothesis, 
for some closed term t. Therefore, 
APPENDIX B 
Proposition 1 (repeated). Let P and G be a program and a closed goal of the modal 
language L,. If, for a given S4 interpretation M = (W, R, 9, e) and a world 
w E W with every constant of P in g(w), M, w bs4 P A 7 G, then there is an 
S4 interpretation MH = (W, R, _&BH, H e > with constant domain U, such that 
MH,w ks4 PA 7 G. 
PROOF. Let 9Jw) = U, and e,(w) = {p(ai ,..., a,): p(a, ,..., a,) me and 
a,, . . . , a, E Up) for all w E W. In order to prove Proposition 1, we will prove that, 
for each clause D and closed goal G in the language of P and for all w ’ E W such 
that wRw’, the following two statements hold: 
(1) If M, w’ ks4 7 G, then MH, w’ bs4 7 G, 
(2) If M,w’ ks4 D, then MH,w’ bs4 D. 
From (1) and (21, since the accessibility relation R is reflexive and, therefore, 
wRw, we can derive the thesis. 
In the following proof, we will make use of the fact that, by hypothesis, every 
constant of P is in .9(w), i.e., U, s_&w). Moreover, since the domains are 
increasing, S(w) cNw’> for all w’ such that wRw’. We prove (1) and (2) by 
simultaneous induction on the structure of D and G. 
Let us first prove (1). We consider all the possible cases for G. 
l If G = T, since M,w’ kIs4 T, (1) holds trivially. 
l If G= q p(u,,...,u,), then 
M,w’ +, 1 q p(a,,...,u,) 
iff for some world w” E W such that w’Rw”, M, w” ks4 p(u,, . . . , a,) 
iff for some world w” E W such that w’Rw”, p(u,, . . . , a,> $5 e(w”) 
iff for some world w” E W such that w’Rw”, p(u,, . . ., a,) E eH(w”) 
(since G is in the language of P, a,, . . . , a, E U,> 
iff for some world w” E W such that w’Rw”, MH, w” kt,, p(u,, . . . , a,> 
MH,w’ks4 1 q ~(a,,...,a,). 
l If G = G, A G,, then 
M,w’ KS4 l(G, A G,) 
iff M, W’ #s4 G, A G, 
iff M,w’es4G1 orM,w’kt,,G, 
3 MH,w’ #s4 G, or MH, w’ #s4 G, [since G, and G, are subformulas 
of G, by inductive hypothesis, (1) holds for them] 
iff MH, w’ !#,, G, A G, 
:4x iI,4 . ..I c -I/I AC\ 
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l If G = 3xG’, then 
M, w’ bs4 -T 3xG’ 
iff M, w’ gs4 3xG’ 
iff for all c E%w’), M,w’ i#s, G’[c/xl 
* for all c E UP, M, w’ ks4 G’[c/x] [since UP C&(W) cNw’>l 
- for all c E UP, MH, w’ ks4 G’[c/xl (by inductive hypothesis, since 
G’[c/x] is in the language of P and wi?w’, (1) holds for G’[c/xl) 
iff MH, w’ ws, 3xG’ 
iff MH,w’ t==s4 7 3xG’. 
l If G= q (DIG’), then 
M, w’ bs4 7 q (D 3G’) 
iff for some world w” E W: w ‘Rw”, M, w” #,, D I G’ 
iff for some world w” E W: w’Rw”, M, w” ps4 D and M, w” I+, G’ 
* for some world w” E W: w’Rw”, MH,w” ks4 D and HH,w” #1s4 G’ 
(by inductive hypothesis, since both D and G’ are subformulas of Gl 
iff for some world w” E W: w’Rw”, MH, w” kts4 D I G’ 
iff MH, w’ bs4 7 q (D 3 G’). 
Let us now prove (2). We consider all the possible cases for D. 
l If D=G~~p(a~,...,a,),then 
M,w’I=,,Gx q p(a,,...,u,) 
iff M,w’ I+,, G or M, w” bs4 p(u,,. ..,a,), for all worlds w” E W such 
that w’Rw” 
iff M,w’gS4G orp(u,,..., a,) E e(w”), for all worlds w” E W such 
that w ’ Rw” 
3 n/r,, w’ I+~, G or ~(a,, . . . , a,,) E eH(w”), for all worlds w” E W such 
that w’Rw” [since G is a subformula of D, (1) holds for G; moreover, 
since D is in the language of P, a,, . . . , a,, E UP] 
iff MH, w’ ks4 G or MH, w” bs4 ~(a,, . . . , a,*), for all worlds w” E W 
such that wrRwn 
iff MH,w’kS4G3 q p(u ,,..., a,). 
l If D =D, AD,, then 
M, w’ i=s4 D, AD, 
iff M, w’ ~~~ D, and M,w’ ks4 D, 
=MH,w’ KS4 D, and MH, w’ bs4 D, [since D, and D, are subformu- 
las of D, by inductive hypothesis, (2) holds for them] 
iff MH,w’ ks4 D, AD,. 
l If D = VxD’, then 
M, w’ ks4 VxD’ 
iff for all c ES~(W’), M,w’ ks4 D’[c/x] 
* for all c E Up, M,w’ ks4 D’[c/x] [since UP CNW) c@w’)] 
* for all c E UP, MH,w’ ks4 D’[c/x] (by inductive hypothesis, since 
D’[c/x] is in the language of P, (2) holds for D’[c/x]) 
iff MH,w’ ks4 VxD’. 0 
Let us prove the analogue for the language L, with open dynamic blocks. In the 
following, let L; be the language obtained by adding to L, countably many new 
constants. In the next theorem, we will consider Kripke interpretations in which 9 
is a function from the set of worlds W to a set of constants of L;. 
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Proposition 2. Let P and G be a program and a closed goal of the modal language 
L,. If, for a given S4 interpretation M = ( W, R, _c&, e> and a world w E W with 
every constant of P in NW>, M,w Ks4 P A 7 G, then there is an S4 interpreta- 
tion MH = (W, R, gH, eH> with constant domain U, such that MN, w ks4P A 
7G. 
PROOF. Let gH(w) = U, and e,(w) = {p&z,, . . . , a,): ~(a,, . . . , a,> E e(w) and 
a,, . . ., a, E U,}, for all w E W. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. In 
language L,, however, the definition of clauses is different w.r.t. language L,: 
there is an additional 0 in front of each clause definition and each universal 
quantifier. So we have to consider the cases D = q I(G 3 0 ~(a,, . . . , a,)> and 
D = q VXD, instead of the corresponding cases in the proof of Proposition 1. 
l If D = q (G 13 0 p(a,, . . . , a,)), then 
M,w’bs4 q (Gl q phzl,...,a,)) 
iff M,w” bs4 Gx q p(u,,..., an), for all worlds w - E W such that 
W’RW - 
iff M, w - kt,, G or M, w” ks4 ~(a,, . . ., an), for all worlds w -, w” E W 
such that W’RW - and w +_ Rw” 
iff M, w - K,, G or ~(a,,. . . , a,) E e(w”), for all worlds w _, w” E W 
such that w’Rw” and W-Rw” 
=$MH,w” kt,, G or ~(a,,..., a,) E eH(w”), for all worlds w I, w” E W 
such that w ’ Rw - and w _ Rw” [ MH, w * k+, G since G is a subfor- 
mula of D and, given that WRW * (by transitivity of RI, (1) 
holds for G; ~(a,, . . . , a,) E eJw”) since, as hypothesis, D is in 
the language of P, and thus a,, . . . , a, E U,] 
iff MH, w - #s4 G or MH, w” bs4 ~(a,, . . . , an), for all worlds w _ , w” E 
W such that w ‘Rw - and w _ Rw’ 
iff M*,w”!=~~G~ q p(a,,..., an), for all worlds w - E W such that 
W’RW - 
iff MH,w’!=s4 q I(G~ q p(u, ,..., a,)). 
l If D = q VxD’, then 
M, w’ Fs4 q VXD 
iff M, w _ bs4 VxD’, for all worlds w - E W such that w’Rw - 
iff for all c E@W “1, M, w - i=s4 O’[c/x], for all worlds w _ E W such 
that w’Rw” 
=;) for all c E U,, M, w - bs4 O’[c/x] for all worlds w _ E W such that 
w’Rw - [since U, ca(w> CS~(W’) C@W “>I 
= for all c E U,, MH, w _ ks4 D’[c/x] for all worlds w +. E W such that 
W’RW - (by inductive hypothesis, since D’[c/xl is in the language of 
P and WRW- by transitivity of R) 
iff M,, w * ks4VxD’, for all worlds w - E W such that w’Rw - 
iff MH,w’ Fs4 q VxD’. q 
When Kripke interpretations with constant domain U, are considered for the 
language L 1, the modal operator 0 in front of universal quantifiers can be 
eliminated. In this case, by replacing q VXD with VxD in the first-order modal 
language L,, the language -E; is obtained: 
_5?r : GE= T/O AIG, A G,l3xGlo(D 3G), 
D := q (G II q A)ID, r\D,IVxD. 
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To prove that the language Pi is equivalent to the language L,, we define a 
mapping o from formulas in L, to formulas in Pi, as follows: 
T” = T, 
(o/I)“= q A, 
(3xG)” = 3xG”, 
(o(D1G))“= q (D”XG”), 
(Dl AD2)o=D; ADO,, 
(o(Gx q A))“= q (G"x o/l), 
( q VxD)” = VxD”. 
Let us first prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 3. Let P be a program in the modal language -E;. Let Hn = ( W, R, 5.3, e> be 
an S4 interpretation with constant domain U, [i.e., NW> = U,, for all w E WI. 
For all worlds w E Wand for all programs D in the language PI, with symbols in P, 
MH,w bs4 D - Mn,wk/, q D. 
PROOF. In the direction (e=), it is obvious since R is rejlexiue. We prove (*) by 
induction on the structure of D. 
l IfD=o(GIoA),then 
MH,wk=s4 q (Gx q /I) 
-M”,w’ bs4 G 3 0 A, for all worlds w ’ E W such that WRW ’ 
-MH,wU l=s4 G 1 0 A, for all worlds w - , w” E W such that WRW - 
and w - Rw” (since R is transitive) 
-Mt,,w” k:s4 0 (G I 0 A), for all worlds w _ E W such that WRW - 
-Mu,w % 0 q I(G II 0 A) (i.e., MH,w ks4 0 0). 
l If D = VxD’, then 
Mn,w k,,VxD’ 
- for all t E Up, Mn, w ks4 D’[t/xl 
- for all t E Up, MH,w ks4 0 D’[t/xl (by inductive hypothesis) 
= for all t E U,, for all worlds w ’ E W such that WRW ‘, Mn, w ’ ks4 
D’b/xl 
=j for all worlds w ’ E W such that wRw ‘, for all t E U,, Mn, w ’ bs4 
D’[t/xl 
- for all worlds w ’ E W such that wRw’, Mn, w ’ ks4 VxD’ 
- M,, w kg 0 VxD’ (i.e., MH, w ks4 q D). 
l If D=D, AD,, then 
MH,w ks4 D, AD, 
=+ MH,w Es4 D, and Mu,w ks4 D, 
=+Mn,wgsd II D, and Mr,,w bs4 0 D, (by inductive hypothesis) 
* for all worlds w ’ E W such that WRW ‘, Mn, w ’ ks4 D, and for all 
worlds w’ E W such that wRw’, Mn, w’ ~~~ D, 
- for all worlds w’ E W such that wRw’, MH,w’ ks4 D, AD, 
-Mr,>w bs.4 ~(0, AD,) (i.e., Mn,w ks4 q D). 13 
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In particular, by Lemma 3, we have ‘that, for all worlds w E W and for all 
formulas VxD in the language PE;, MH,w bs4 VxD iff MH,w Ks4 q VxD. We will 
make use of this equivalence in the proof of the next proposition. 
Proposition 3. Let P be a program in the modal language L,. Let MH = 
(W, R, g, e) be un S4 interpretation with fixed domain U, [i.e., g(w) = U,, for 
all w E W]. For all worlds w E Wand for all programs D and closed goals G in the 
language L ,, with symbols in P: 
(9 MH,wks4G * MH,wkS4G0, 
(ii) MH,w i=S4 D - MH,w kS4 D”. 
PROOF. 6) and (ii> can be proved by simultaneous induction on the structure of D 
and G. 
Let us first prove (i) 
l If G=T and G= q A,(i)holdsobviously,since T”=T and(oA)“= CIA. 
l If G = G, A G,, then 
MH, w bs4 G, A G, 
iff MH,w kS4 G, and MH,w kS4 G, 
iff MH, w @s4 Gy and MH, w bs4 G; [since G, and G, are subformulas 
of G, by inductive hypothesis, (i) holds for them] 
iff MH,w kS4 Gy A G; 
iff MH, w kS4 (G, A G,)” (by definition of the mapping “). 
l If G=%G,,then 
MH,w t=s4 3xG, 
iff for some t E Up, MH, w i=s4 G,[t/xl 
iff for some t E Up, MH, w kS4 (G,[t/x])” (by inductive hypothesis) 
iff MH, w kS4 3xc”, 
iff MH, w t=S4 ElxG,)” (by definition of the mapping “>. 
l If G= lIl(D3G,), then 
MH,w kS4 q (D 2 G,) 
iff for all worlds w ’ E W WKW ‘, MH, w ’ ks4 D 1 G, 
iff for all worlds w’ E W: wRw’, MH,w’ #,, D or M,w’ KS4 G, 
iff for all worlds w ’ E W: wRw ‘, MH, w ’ #s4 D” or M, w ’ ks4 Gy (by 
inductive hypothesis, since both D and G, are subformulas of G) 
iffforallworldsw’EW: wRw’, M,,w’k=,,D”~G~ 
iff MH,w ks4 q (D” 3Gy) 
iff MH, w kS4 (0 (D 3 G,)Y (by definition of the mapping “1. 
Let us now prove (ii). 
l If D= q (GI q A), then 
MH,w kS4 q (G 10 A) 
iff MHr w ’ bs4 G 3 q A, for all worlds w ’ E W such that WRW ’ 
iff MH,w’ #,, G or MH,w’ kS4 q A, for all worlds w’ E W such that 
WRW ’ 
iff MH,w’ !#s4 G” or MH,w’ kS4 0 A, for all worlds w ’ E W such that 
WRW’ (by inductive hypothesis, since G is a subformula of D> 
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iff MH,w’ bs4 G” 2 0 A, for all worlds w’ E W such that W&V’ 
iff MH, w ks4 q l(Go 2 0 A) 
iff MH, w ks4 ( 0 (G 1 0 A))” (by definition of the mapping “). 
l If D = D, A D,, then we proceed as for G = G, A G,. 
l If D = q VxD,, then 
MH,w ks4 q VXD, 
iff MH, w’ ks4 VxD,, for all worlds w’ E W such that WRW’ 
iff for all t E UP, MH,w’ ks4 D,[t/x], for all worlds w’ E W such that 
WRW ’ 
iff for all t E Up, MH,w’ ks4 (D,[t/x])o, for all worlds w’ E W such that 
WRW ’ (by inductive hypothesis) 
iff MH, w ’ ~~~ VxDy , for all worlds w ’ E W such that WRW ’ 
iff MH, w k4 q VxDi’ 
iff MH, w t=s4 VxDy (by Lemma 3, since VxDy is a formula in _Y1) 
iff MH, w ks4 ( 0 VxD,)” (by definition of the mapping “). 0 
We are grateful to Dale Miller for the stimulating discussions on the subject of this paper. Also, we wish 
to thank the anonymous referees for their careful checking of the work and their helpful comments. 
REFERENCES 
1. Abadi, M. and Manna, Z., Modal theorem proving, in: Proc. 8th Int. Conf. on Automated 
Deduction, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 230, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1986, 
pp. 172-189. 
2. Abadi, M. and Manna, Z., Temporal logic programming, .I. Symbolic Comput. 8:277-295 
(1989). 
3. Baldoni, M., Giordano, L., and Martelli, A., A multimodal logic to define modules in 
logic programming, in: Proc. ILPS’93 Int. Logic Programming Symposium, Vancouver, 
October 1993, pp. 473-486. 
4. Bonner, A. J., McCarty, L. T., and Vadaparty, K., Expressing database queries with 
intuitionistic logic, in: Logic Programming: Proceedings of the 1989 North American 
Conference, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989, pp. 831-850. 
5. Bowen, K. A. and Kowalski, R. A., Amalgamating language and metalanguage in logic 
programming, in: Clark and Tarlund (eds.), Logic Programming, Academic Press, New 
York, 1982, pp. 153-172. 
6. Brogi, A., Lamma, E., and Mello, P., Inheritance and hypothetical reasoning in logic 
programming, in: Proc. European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Stockholm, 1990, 
pp. 105-110. 
7. Brogi, A., Lamma, E., and Mello, P., A General Framework for Structuring Logic 
Programs, Technical Report, Progetto Finalizzato Sistemi Informatici e Calcolo Parallelo, 
Pisa, 1990. 
8. Brogi, A., Mancarella, P., Pedreschi, D., and Turini, F., Meta for modularising logic 
programming, in: fioc. META92, Stockholm, 1992. 
9. Chen, W., A theory of modules based on second order logic, in: Proc. Symp. on Logic 
Programming, San Francisco, 1987, pp. 24-33. 
10. Fariiias de1 Cerro, L., MOLOG: A system that extends Prolog with modal logic, New 
Generation Comput. 4:35-50 (1986). 
94 L. GIORDANO AND A. MARTELLI 
11. Fariiias de1 Cerro, L. and Herzig, A., Metaprogramming through intensional deduction: 
some examples, in: Proc. META92, Stockholm, 1992. 
12. Fitting, M., Model existence theorems for modal and intuitionistic logics, J. Symbolic 
Logic 38(4):613-627 (1973). 
13. Fitting, M., Proof Methods for Modal and Intuitionistic Lo&s, Synthese Library, vol. 169, 
D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983. 
14. Gabbay, D. M. and Reyle, N., N-Prolog: An extension of Prolog with hypothetical 
implications. I., J. Logic Program. 1(4):319-355 (1984). 
15. Gabbay, D. M., N-Prolog: An extension of Prolog with hypothetical implications. II., J. 
Logic Program. 2(4):251-283 (1985). 
16. Garson, J. W., Quantification in modal logic, in: D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), 
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. II, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984, pp. 249-307. 
17. Giordano, L., Martelli, A., and Rossi, G. F., Local definitions with static scope rules in 
logic programming, in: Proc. Int. Conf on Fifth Generation Computer Systems, Tokyo, 
1988, pp. 389-396. 
18. Giordano, L., Martelli, A., and Rossi, G. F., Extending Horn clause logic with implica- 
tion goals, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 95:43-74 (1992). 
19. Giordano, L. and Martelli, A., A modal reconstruction of blocks and modules in logic 
programming, in: Proc. 1991 Int. Logic Programming Symposium, San Diego, October 
1991, pp. 239-253. 
20. Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M. J., An Introduction to Modal Logic, Methuen, London, 
1968. 
21. Mancarella, P. and Pedreschi, D., An algebra of logic programs, in: Proc. Fifth Znt. Conf 
of Logic Programming, Seattle, 1988, pp. 1006-1023. 
22. McCabe, F. G., Logic and Objects: Language, Applications and Implementation, Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of London, 1988. 
23. McCarty, L. T., Clausal intuitionistic logic. I. Fixed-point semantics, J. Logic Program. 
5(1):1-31 (1988). 
24. McCarty, L. T., Clausal intuitionistic logic. II. Tableau proof procedure, J. Logic 
Program. 5(2):93-132 (1988). 
25. Miller, D. A., A theory of modules for logic programming, in: Proc. Third IEEE Symp. on 
Logic Programming, IEEE, New York, 1986, pp. 106-114. 
26. Miller, D. A., A logical analysis of modules in logic programming, J. Logic Program. 
6:79-108 (1989). 
27. Miller, D. A., Lexical scoping as universal quantification, in: Proc. 6th Znt. Conf on Logic 
Programming, Lisbon, 1989, pp. 268-283. 
28. Miller, D. A., Abstract syntax and logic programming, in: Logic Programming: Proceed- 
ings of the Second Russian Conference, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 592, 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1992, pp. 322-337. 
29. Monteiro, L. and Porto, A., Contextual logic programming, in: Proc. 6th Znt. Conf on 
Logic Programming, Lisbon, 1989, pp. 284-299. 
30. Moscowitz, Y. and Shapiro, E., Lexical logic programs, in: Proc. 8th int. Conf on Logic 
Programming, Paris, 1991, pp. 349-363. 
31. Nait Abdallah, M. A., Ions and local definitions in logic programming, in: Proc. 
STACS’86, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 210, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1986, 
pp. 60-72. 
32. O’Keefe, R. A., Towards an algebra for constructing logic programs, in: Proc. Symp. on 
Logic PTogmmming, Boston, 1985, pp. 152-160. 
33. Warren, D. S., Database updates in pure Prolog, in: Proc. Int. Conf on Fifth Generation 
Computer Systems, Tokyo, 1984, pp. 244-253. 
